|
The BBC is broadcasting the Chilcot "Inquiry" live on its website. There is also a Guardian blog providing minute-by-minute coverage of Sir John Chilcot's investigation into the war in Iraq. See also the inquiry website and the timetable.
Former UK Ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer is giving evidence at the time of writing:
One interesting statement made by Meyer is the following:
11.17am: Here's that key Meyer quote (see 11.04am):
'The real problem, which I did draw several times to the attention of London, was that the contingency military timetable had been decided before the UN inspectors went in under Hans Blix. So you found yourself in a situation in the autumn of 2002 where you could not synchronise the military timetable with the inspection timetable.
The American military had been given instructions to prepare for war. Initially it was "we want you ready by January". There was a lot of confusion inside the American military establishment about the size of the force, they wanted to bring an army down from Germany and pass it through Turkey. So January was never realistic and in the end it went back to March.
All that said, when you looked at the timetable for the inspections, it was impossible to see how Blix could bring the process to a conclusion, for better or for worse, by March.
So the result was to turn resolution 1441 on its head. Because 1441 had been a challenge to Saddam Hussein, agreed unanimously, to prove his innocence. But because you could not synchronise the programmes, somehow or other, programme, preparation of war, inspections, you had to short-circuit the inspection process by finding the notorious smoking gun. And suddenly, because of that, the unforgiving nature of the military timetable, we found ourselves scrabbling for the smoking gun, which was another way of saying "it's not that Saddam has to prove that he's innocent, we've now bloody well got to try and prove that he's guilty". And we - the Americans, the British - have never really recovered from that because of course there was no smoking gun.'
The writer of the BBC minute by minute blog comments "This is by far the most important part of the evidence so far. [...] Meyer seems to be saying the inspection process was doomed to fail. In other words, it was a charade."
The following is also significant:
'12.22pm: Freedman asks if there was an concept of how awful the aftermath would be.
Meyer says the Americans were worried about a humanitarian disaster.
"What just disappeared from the calculations was the understanding that after Saddam was topped you would have to maintain law and order."
The American miltiary did not maintain law and order because they were not told to.'
'12.25pm: Chilcot asks aftermath planning.
It would not have been impossible if it had started in the autumn of 2002.
He says he often thinks: "What would Margaret Thatcher have done? I think she would have insisted on a coherent diplomatic and political strategy and [planning for after the toppling of Saddam]."
The Guardian minute by minute blogger says of this: "That's another key quote from the session. All Meyer's Labour enemies are going to hate him for it.'
He summarises the session as follows:
"1. Meyer accused Blair of failing to exert enough pressure on Bush. In particular, he said that post-war planning would have been much better if Blair had made this a condition of Britain supporting the war. That's what Thatcher would have done, Meyer said.
2. Meyer revealed that the inspection process was doomed to fail. He said Hans Blix never had enough time to carry out proper inspections because the Americans had already set a timetable for war. This meant the Americans and British were reduced to looking for a "smoking gun" that they failed to find."
|
